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This paper examines the link between nonperforming loans, real estate prices, 
and the banking system.  We found that the level of nonperforming loans 
affects bank profitability as well as the price performance of real estate 
markets.  We also analyzed the factors that cause the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total loans to fluctuate.  We observed that a higher ratio of corporate 
loans to individual loans results in a lower percentage of nonperforming loans.  
In contrast, a lower real estate lending rate relative to the primary lending rate 
leads to a higher percentage of nonperforming loans.  These results suggest 
that the percentage of nonperforming loans can be partially governed by the 









Since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the subject of nonperforming loans 
has been revisited heavily by academics and practitioners alike (Kwack, 44 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
2000, Quigley, 2001, Collyns, and Senhadji, 2002).  Nonperforming loans 
(NPL) have been labeled one of the likely suspects of the financial markets’ 
collapse in Asia.  Their effects on the financial and real estate markets and 
the factors that cause them are of interest to researchers.  
 
Kwack’s (2000) data set of Asian economies between the years 1994 and 
1997 shows that the percentage of nonperforming loans increased steadily in 
some countries such as Taiwan, and dramatically in other countries such as 
Korea and Thailand.
1  The Goldman Sachs study of Asian bank portfolios 
conducted in September 1998 reported even higher estimates of NPL 
percentages between 1997 and 1999: 11% for Singapore, 15% for Hong 
Kong, 20% for Malaysia, 29% for the Philippines, 34% for Korea, and 50% 




Table 1 Real Estate Sector and National Economy 
Country  Real Estate Loans as a 
Percent of Total Bank 
Loans 
Average Exposure to 
Real Estate as Percent of 
GNP 
Hong Kong  40-50  76 
Taiwan 35-45  58 
Malaysia 30-40  58 
Thailand 30-40  44 
Singapore 30-40  30 
Korea 15-25  17 
Philippines 15-25  17 
China 35-40  9 
Indonesia 25-30  7 
Table 1 represents statistics of Asian economies’ dependence on real estate markets.  
The source is Quigley (2001). 
 
What causes the percentage of nonperforming loans to rise in some of the 
emerging Asian economies?  Although the results up to now have been 
rather indirect, the lending practices of banks are viewed as likely candidates.  
Reynolds, Ratanakomut, and Gander (2000) suggested that the banks’ 
aggressive lending policies, coupled with weak profitability, led to the 
financial crisis.  Kwack (2000) found that a high corporate leverage ratio 
                                                 
1 The percentage of nonperforming loans in 1994 for Taiwan, Korea, and Thailand was 1.85%, 
7.80%, and 7.50%, respectively.  By 1997, these percentages had increased to 3.82%, 17.00%, 
and 18.00% for the same countries. 
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affects the level of nonperforming loans.  A troubled real estate sector could 
be another contributing force to a rising nonperforming loan ratio.  The 
potential exposure of the national economy to the real estate sector in these 
economies is relatively large.  Table 1 has statistics on the average exposure 
to real estate as a percentage of GNP, and the real estate loans as a 
percentage of total bank loans (Quigley, 2001).  The ratio of real estate debt 
to GNP was more than half in Taiwan and Malaysia, and more than three 
quarters in Hong Kong in 1996.  Furthermore, the percentage of real estate 
loans is around 40% to 55% in Hong Kong, followed closely by Taiwan at 
35% to 45%.  Based on the same Goldman Sachs study, Quigley also 
reported real estate loans as a percentage of the total nonperforming loans 
portfolio for Hong Kong.  This figure was expected to be as high as 60% in 
1997, 52% in 1998, and 50% for 1999.  
 
The rise in nonperforming loan ratios has serious consequences for the 
economy.  Bernstein (1996) developed a model in which he showed that the 
level of nonperforming loans is a significant determinant of the level of bank 
costs, as well as the estimates of scale economies in banking.  Kwack (2000) 
is one of the numerous authors who suggested nonperforming loans as a 
cause of the Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
Several authors have also linked real estate markets with financial markets.  
Allen, Madura, and Wiant (1995) and He, Myer, and Webb (1996) have 
found that bank stocks are very sensitive to changes in real estate market 
returns.  King (2001) claimed that the Asian Financial Crisis was triggered 
by Japanese commercial banks that were considerably weakened by the 
collapse of real estate markets.  Quigley (2001) suggested that the activities 
in the real estate market contributed to the severity of the crisis.  Lu and So 
(2003) found that Asian banks were significantly exposed to real estate risk 
in the post-crisis era.  
 
The lending policy of banks is also affected by nonperforming loan ratios.  
Banks will adjust their loan preference ratios and the weight of risky loans in 
order to avoid a crisis.  This will lead to a more conservative real estate 
lending policy, as suggested by Shen and Chang (2002).  However, the more 
restrictive lending policy may lead to a poor performance in the real estate 
sector, thereby exacerbating a possible crisis. 
 
In summary, real estate markets, nonperforming loans and the banking 
system are all closely related.  Most past studies have concentrated on two 
out of these three factors at a time, but far less has been documented on the 
interaction of these three variables.  We attempted to analyze the 
determinants and consequences of nonperforming loans by focusing on their 
ability to link real estate markets and the banking system.  We also added 46 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
two new explanatory variables that have not received a lot of attention 
before.  The real estate lending rate relative to the primary lending rate is the 
first variable.  We would expect this variable to shift the percentage of real 
estate loans, as well as change the characteristics of the pool of borrowers.  
We also controlled for the amount of corporate real estate loans with respect 
to the amount of individual real estate loans.  Since corporate loans, on 
average, are viewed as being less risky than individual loans, this would 
have a direct impact on the percentage of nonperforming loans. 
 
Taiwan experienced a rise in nonperforming loans prior to the crisis.   
Furthermore, the Taiwanese economy has had a relatively high exposure to 
real estate both in terms of GNP and total bank loans.  This makes Taiwan 
an ideal candidate for analyzing the issues mentioned above.  Using the 
Granger causality test (1996), we modeled the causal relationships between 
the performance of the real estate market (as proxied by the housing prices), 
nonperforming loans, and returns to the banking sector.  We confirmed that 
the percentage of nonperforming loans Granger-caused the profitability of 
the banking sector.  We then used simultaneous equations to estimate the 
determinants of nonperforming loans and to analyze their impact on the real 
estate markets and the banking system.  We found that lower real estate 
lending rates relative to primary lending rates cause nonperforming loans to 
rise.  In contrast, a higher ratio of corporate real estate loans to individual 
real estate loans leads to lower levels of nonperforming loans.  Finally, we 
observed that the nonperforming loan ratio has negative and significant 
effects on both real estate markets and the banking system. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 builds the 
hypothesis and discusses existing literature.  Section 3 introduces the data 
and sample statistics.  Section 4 introduces the econometric model and 





Although the topics of real estate, nonperforming loans, and the banking 
system have always been of interest to researchers, the related literature on 
these topics experienced a surge during and after the Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
One of the earlier studies done on the topic of the banking and real estate 
sectors is by Mei and Saunders (1995).  They developed an asset pricing 
framework in which they looked at the interaction of ex-ante risk premiums 
on both bank stock returns and real estate returns for the period 1970 to 1989.  
They also studied the time-varying component of these premiums with 
respect to economic and real estate market conditions.  They found that the Banking System, Real Estate Markets, and Nonperforming Loans 47 
 
time variations in bank risk premiums are partially determined by interest 
rates and the real estate market.  They also discovered that the real estate 
factor was important for banks during the 1980s.  
 
Similarly, Allen, Madura, and Wiats (1995) used a seemingly unrelated 
regression model to determine whether bank returns are systematically 
affected by real estate market performance.  Their data set spans the years 
between 1979 and 1992.  They were able to document a positive and 
significant relationship between bank returns and changing real estate values 
even after accounting for the effects of the financial markets and interest 
rates.  They also observed that bank performance sensitivity to the real estate 
sector increases over time.  
 
He, Myer, and Webb (1996) used a three-index model to examine the 
sensitivities of stock returns for different bank groups.  They found that bank 
stocks are quite sensitive to changes in real estate returns.  Specifically, they 
observed that banks with high proportions of real estate loans are most 
affected by changes in real estate returns. 
 
Mei and Saunders (1997) took a slightly different route and examined bank 
performance in light of real estate as an investment tool.  They found that the 
strategy of commercial banks and thrifts is to base their decisions on past 
real estate returns rather than projected ones.  The authors labeled this 
strategy “trend-chasing,” and presented their findings as an explanation as to 
why these real estate investments have performed poorly.  Their data set 
spans 1970 to 1989 for commercial banks, savings and loans, and life 
insurance companies, and they used monthly REIT returns as their proxy for 
real estate asset returns.  They found that real estate markets excess returns 
are mean reverting; therefore, buying after positive excess returns and selling 
after negative excessive returns will produce a money-losing strategy. 
 
The relative risk factor of real estate loans has been studied from an agency 
cost standpoint as well.  Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Mishkin (1996), and 
Allen and Gale (2000) all discussed the moral hazard and adverse selection 
issues that are amplified in the real estate market.  Due to weaknesses in 
financial regulations, banks take on excessive levels of risk by lending to 
risky subjects, such as real estate developers or buyers.  In turn, the investors 
who are the most likely to default tend to apply for these loans, thereby 
generating a temporary bubble.  
 
There has also been some work done on the effect of nonperforming loans 
on the banking system.  Bernstein (1996) showed that the level of 
nonperforming loans is a significant determinant of the level of bank costs, 
as well as of the estimates of scale economies in banking.  He found that the 48 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
cost curve of banks with high levels of nonperforming loans have the 
standard U-Shape, with the optimal point residing between five and ten 
billion dollars.  On the other hand, the banks with low levels of 
nonperforming loans do not exhibit the same characteristics.  Their cost 
curve shows that scale economies increase continuously with bank size. 
 
Reynolds, Ratanakomut, and Gander (2000) also looked at bank size and 
further examined the bank financial structure in Asia prior to the financial 
crisis.  They regressed financial performance ratios such as loan preference, 
capital adequacy, liquidity, and profitability on structural variables such as 
assets and income.  They found that during financial liberalization, loan-
preference ratios were lower, which they interpreted as increased levels of 
risk.  They also found that for some countries (Indonesia, Korea, and 
Thailand), the banks showed a stronger lending performance but weaker 
profitability, which may have led to the financial crisis.  They also observed 
that bank size matters, since profits and loan preferences increase with size, 
and capital adequacy decreases with size. 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis generated a lot of questions regarding the culprits 
and the underlying reasons for this phenomenon.  Quigley (2001) is one of 
the many authors who suggested that real estate markets were very 
significant in explaining the Asian Financial Crisis.  His study bears 
similarities to ours.  He pointed out the increasing supply of office space (as 
proxied by vacancy rates), the high ratio of asset prices to market rents, the 
high growth rate of bank credit, the high ratio of nonperforming real estate 
loans, the relative size of the real estate sector, and the relative weight of real 
estate among nonperforming assets as indicators of an upcoming crisis.   
Quigley reported the percentage of real estate bank loans in Taiwan to be in 
the 35 to 45% range with an average Moody’s rating of D.  He also reported 
a bank intermediation ratio of 1.46 and the average exposure to real estate as 
percentage of GNP to be 58%.  He likened the price increase in real estate to 
a Ponzi scheme by stating that when real estate is the only form of collateral, 
there is a strong incentive for investors to buy into an appreciating market in 
order to borrow funds to expand.  
 
Collyns and Senhadji (2002) examined the link between lending booms, 
asset price cycles, and financial crises across the East Asian countries.  They 
found a strong relationship between bank loans and asset price inflation.  
They stated that the optimistic growth expectations, heavy capital inflows, 
inadequate corporate governance, and dependence on intermediation by 
under-regulated banks all led to a rapid credit growth, especially in the real 
estate market.  Like earlier papers regarding agency cost issues, they stated 
that the real estate market is particularly vulnerable to the formation of price 
bubbles because information asymmetries are larger, the supply is more rigid, Banking System, Real Estate Markets, and Nonperforming Loans 49 
 
and the market is therefore more imperfect.  They documented the 
contemporaneous rise of non-performing loans, property exposure, and real 
estate prices in Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore.  Through a VAR analysis, they concluded that 
property prices are strongly pro-cyclical, and bank loans contributed to the 
inflation of property prices prior to the crisis period.  They also found that 
the response of property prices to credit is stronger during times of rising 
prices than the response during times of falling prices.  The main policy 
implications of the paper are to strengthen credit assessment while reducing 
reliance on collateral, and to reduce the moral hazards in the banking system. 
 
In a related vein, Kallberg, Liu, and Pasquariello (2002) examined the 
impact of regime shifts on Asian equity and real estate markets between 
1992 and 1998.  They applied Granger causality and found that equity 
returns cause real estate returns, but not vice versa.  However, they did 
observe two-way causality for the volatilities of both markets.  They also 
found that a country’s exposure to trade and firm leverage are important.  
They concluded that regime shifts lead to higher relative risk for real estate 
securities. 
 
Another study that is closely related to ours is that of Kwack (2000), who 
looked at whether there is a relationship between the Asian Financial Crisis 
and the weakness of financial institutions, as well as the levels of 
international interest rates, short-term debt, excessive lending, and current 
account deficits.  The author conducted empirical analyses between 1995 
and 1997 in seven Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  He found that the 3-month 
LIBOR interest rate, the nonperforming loan rates, and the corporate 
leverage ratio are very significant in explaining the Asian Financial Crisis.  
He also modeled the level of nonperforming loans by including corporate 
leverage, LIBOR, the weight of short-term debt with respect to total debt, the 
claims of bank deposits of the private sector as a multiple of GDP, the 
current account balance as a fraction of GDP, the corporate operating margin, 
and the weight of equity with respect to total assets for banks.  With the 
exception of the corporate leverage ratio, he did not find any significance for 
any of the variables using OLS.  
 
Our study attempts to link real estate, nonperforming loans, and the banking 
system.  The determinants of nonperforming loans are classified into three 
categories: macroeconomic financial performance, real estate market 
performance, and the lending policies of the banking sector.  When both the 
macroeconomy and real estate market perform well, the level of 50 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
nonperforming loans should be lower.
3   In contrast, if the banks’ loan 
portfolios bear more risk, nonperforming loans are likely to be higher.   
Specifically, we suggest using the relative cost of real estate borrowing to 
general borrowing as a determinant of the level of moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues that have been discussed by other authors.  If the relative 
cost of real estate borrowing is low, then we would expect more of the 
riskier candidates to apply for loans.  In other words, a higher relative real 
estate lending rate will result in lower amounts of real estate loans.  The 
credit risk and probability of nonperforming loans would thus be reduced.  
We also predict the ratio of corporate real estate loans with respect to 
individual real estate loans to be important in explaining the percentage of 
nonperforming loans.  The diversification principle suggests that 
corporations are not as risky as individuals due to their size and the quality 
of their assets.  Therefore, if banks decrease the weight of individual real 
estate loans in their real estate loan portfolios, the level of nonperforming 
loans should go down.  
 
Another piece of the puzzle is analyzing the determinants of banking return.  
We proxied the banking return with several variables: banking profitability 
(BP),
4 the return on assets (ROA),
5 the return on equity (ROE),
6 the stock 
return to the banking sector, and a composite index of the last three factors 
mentioned (GBRI).
7   We classified the key determinants as credit risk, 
macroeconomic performance, interest rates, and size.  The nonperforming 
loan ratio is used to express credit risk.  As the credit risk is higher, the 
banking return is expected to be lower.  As with the nonperforming loans, 
the macroeconomic conditions should have an impact on the banking returns.  
The net difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate is another 
important determinant of performance, and should have a positive impact on 
bank returns.  Consistent with previous literature, the size of the loan 
portfolio is also expected to affect bank returns positively.   
 
Finally, the last piece of the puzzle is the determinants of the real estate 
market performance, which we propose to proxy by the level of housing 
prices.  We hypothesized that the relevant factors are the nonperforming loan 
ratio, macroeconomic performance, and the demand for housing.  A higher 
nonperforming loan ratio can indirectly affect the real estate market, since 
higher nonperforming loan ratios will push banks to be more conservative, 
thereby causing tighter lending policies and lower housing prices due to 
                                                 
3 In line with prior studies, we propose using GDP as a proxy for macroeconomic performance 
and housing price as a proxy for real estate market performance. 
4 BP = Net Benefits/Net Revenues 
5 ROA = Net Benefits/Assets 
6 ROE = Net Benefits/Equity 
7 GBRI = 50% stock return to the banking sector + 25% Return on Assets + 25% Return on 
Equity. Banking System, Real Estate Markets, and Nonperforming Loans 51 
 
lower demand.  If the financial economy is performing well, then housing 
prices should also be higher.  The demand for housing can be proxied by the 
rate of change for vacant housing.  When the demand for housing is lower, 
prices will inevitably go down.  The three specifications of nonperforming 
loans, banking returns, and real estate returns help us look at all of the 
factors at once and close the feedback loop. 
 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The stock return to the banking sector (SRB), GDP growth rate (GDP), the 
real estate lending rate (Rr), the primary lending rate (Rl), the deposit interest 
rate (Rd), the corporate real estate loans (Corp), the individual real estate 
loans (Ind), the total loans (Loan), and the nonperforming loan ratio (NPL) 
are all obtained from the Taiwan Financial Statistical Abstracts.  The 
housing price (P) is defined as the hedonic housing price measured by the 
Taiwan Real Estate Research Center in Taiwanese Dollars/Ping.  The 
number of vacant houses (Vacq) is reported as a descriptive statistic and 
derived from the data provided by Tai-Power Company.
8  
 
Due to the availability of monthly nonperforming loan data,
9 the  sample 
period starts in January 1996 and ends in April 2003, which produced 88 
observations.  The descriptive statistics are available in Table 2.  The bank 
return figures were all less than 1.5 percent, with the lowest indicator being 
the bank profitability (BP) at 0.009 % and the highest indicator being the 
return on equity (ROE) – 1.486 %.  The ratio of corporate to individual real 
estate loans was less than ¼ at 0.23.  The average GDP growth rate (g) 
during the sample period was close to 4 percent.  The nominal housing price 
in NT dollars per ping (P) was 176,313, and the real housing price in NT 
dollars per ping was 169,051.  The nonperforming loan ratio (NPL) hovered 
around 5 percent, which confirms the statistics found in other studies like 
Quigley’s (2001).  The difference between the lending rate and the deposit 
rate averaged around 3 percentage points.  The quantity of vacant housing 
(Vacq) was under 2 million at 1,577,681, and the rate of change (Vac) was 
less than 1 percent at 0.657 percent.  The ratio of the real estate lending rate 
to the primary lending rate was slightly less than unity at 0.924.  The real 




                                                 
8 If the electricity use of a house is lower than a lower limit threshold value, the house is defined 
as vacant. 
9 Before 1996, the nonperforming loan ratio data was only available on a yearly basis. 52 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
 
Table 2   Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std  Dev 
Bank Assets (Nominal Terms) (NT$ million)  11,691,763 2,226,386 
Bank Assets (Real Terms) (NT$ million)  11,175,330 1,996,757 
Bank Benefits (Nominal Terms) (NT$ million)   11,463 26,221 
Bank Benefits (Real Terms) (NT$ million)  11,116 24,945 
Bank Equity (Nominal Terms) (NT$ million)  914,864 199,717 
Bank Equity (Real Terms) (NT$ million)  874,068 180,998 
Bank Profitability (Net Benefits/Net Revenues) (BP) (%)  0.009 0.018 
Corporate Real Estate Loans (Nominal Terms) (NT$ 
million) 
644,568 93,996 
Corporate Real Estate Loans (Real Terms) (Corp) (NT$ 
million) 
613,756 82,651 
Corporate R.E. Loans/Individual R.E. Loans (Corp/Ind)   0.232 0.194 
Deposit Rate (Rd) (%)  4.501 1.359 
GDP Growth Rate (Nominal Terms) (g) (%)  3.765 3.698 
GDP Growth Rate (Real Terms) (%)  3.163 3.306 
General Banking Return Index (GBRI) (%)  0.357 5.256 
Housing Price (Nominal Terms) (NT$/ping)  176,313 5,790 
Housing Price (Real Terms) (P) (NT$/ping)  169,051 9,486 
Individual Real Estate Loans (Nominal Terms) (NT$ 
million) 
2,775,733 311,088 
Individual Real Estate Loans (Real Terms) (Ind) (NT$ 
million) 
2,643,670 263,872 
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (NPL) (%)  5.177 1.382 
Primary Lending Rate (Rl) (%)  7.771 0.8683 
Primary Lending Rate – Deposit Rate (Rl – Rd) (%)  2.913 0.167 
Quantity of Vacant Housing (Vacq) (units)  1,577,681 671,335 
Rate of Change of Vacq (Vac) (%)   0.657 14.771 
Real Estate Lending Rate (Rr) (%)  6.822 1.857 
Real Estate Lending Rate/Primary Lending Rate (Rr/Rl)   0.924 0.092 
Real Estate Loans (Nominal Terms) (NT$ Million)  3,841,230 381,093 
Real Estate Loans (Real Terms) (LoanR) (NT$ Million)  3,659,004 324,565 
Real Estate Loans/Total Loans (LoanR/Loan) (%)  37.347 2.066 
Return on Bank Assets (ROA) (%)  0.116 0.205 
Return on Bank Equity (ROE) (%)  1.486 2.801 
Stock Return to the Banking Sector (SRB) (%)  0.120 10.192 
Total Loans (Nominal Terms) (NT$ million)  10,365,820 1,521,093 
Total Loans (Real Terms) (Loan) (NT$ million)  9,867,669 1,328,217 
Sample Size  88 88 
Note:  This table shows the descriptive statistics for the sample from January 1996 to 
April 2003.  The units and, if applicable, the variable acronyms and whether the 
variables are shown in real or nominal terms are presented in parentheses.  The 





 Banking System, Real Estate Markets, and Nonperforming Loans 53 
 
The Econometric Model and Empirical Analyses 
 
Since all of three main variable groups, namely, real estate valuation, 
banking profitability, and nonperforming loans, are unit root processes; we 
applied Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969).  We first applied the 
Johanson (1988) co-integration tests as shown in Table 3.  Using the optimal 
lag length of 12, we found the following: The nonperforming loan ratio 
(NPL) was co-integrated with the housing price (P), the stock return to the 
banking sector (SRB), and the general banking return index (GBRI).  The 
housing price (P) was also co-integrated with the stock return to the banking 
sector (SRB) and the general banking return index (GBRI). 
 
We used vector autoregression models (VAR) for the sets of variables that 
were not co-integrated.  The results reported in Table 4 closely follow our 
predictions.  We observed that the return on assets Granger-causes the 
nonperforming loan ratio and the housing price at the 5 percent level of 
significance.  In turn, the nonperforming loan ratio Granger-causes both the 
return on bank assets, as well as the return on bank equity at the 1 percent 
level of significance.  These findings suggest that there is a two-way causal 
relationship between the nonperforming loan ratio and bank returns 
measures by the return on assets.  Furthermore, there is evidence that bank 
returns (ROA) also affect housing prices.  
 
For those sets of variables that are co-integrated, we ran the Granger 
causality tests with the vector error correction model (VEC).  The results are 
presented in Table 5.  This analysis confirms that the nonperforming loan 
ratio Granger-causes the stock returns to the banking sector and the general 
banking return index at the 1 percent level of significance, and housing 
prices at the 10 percent level of significance.  We found that the housing 
price Granger-causes the stock returns to the banking sector at the 5 percent 
level and the general banking return index at the 10 percent level.   
Furthermore, we observed that the stock return to the banking sector 
Granger-causes the nonperforming loan percentage and the housing price at 
the 10 percent level.  Both Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the nonperforming 
loan ratio is a very important determinant of both the banking sector’s 
profitability and the real estate market’s performance. 54 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
 






LR Test Statistics 





NPL and P  12  14.31  1 
NPL and SRB  12  24.20  1 
NPL and ROA  12  5.11  0 
NPL and ROE  12  6.42  0 
NPL and GBRI  12  17.17  1 
P and SRB  12  14.71  1 
P and ROA  12  5.42  0 
P and ROE  12  4.22  0 
P and GBRI  12  12.91  1 
Note: This table shows the results of the Johanson co-integration tests.  NPL is the 
nonperforming loan ratio, P is the housing price in NT$ per ping in real terms, ROA is 
the return on bank assets, ROE is the return on bank equity, SRB is the stock return to 
the banking sector, and GBRI is the general banking return index.  All series are in real 
terms with respect to the first quarter of 1996.  If the log likelihood ratio is greater than 
the 5% critical value, the null hypothesis of no co-integration is rejected.  The 5% 
critical value is 12.53 for all tests reported.  The inferred number of co-integrating 
relationship is shown in the last column. 
 
 
To further our analysis and to perform a robustness check, we developed a 
set of simultaneous equations stemming from our hypotheses discussed in 
Section 2.  The first specification expresses the relationship between the 




































3 2 1 1 0  (1) 
 
where NPL is the nonperforming loan ratio, ∆P is the change in the housing 
price in nominal terms, Rr is the real estate lending rate, Rl is the is the 
primary lending rate, Corp is the amount of corporate real estate loans, and 
Ind is the amount of individual real estate loans.  We expected α1 < 0, α2 < 0,  
α3 < 0, and α4 < 0, according to our hypothesis. 
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Table 4  Granger Causality Tests of the Interaction of Nonperforming 
Loans, Banking Sector Profitability, and Real Estate 
Performance Using Vector Autocorrelation (VAR) 
Null Hypothesis  F-Statistic  P-value 
ROA does not Granger-cause NPL  1.91
**  0.05 
NPL does not Granger-cause ROA  3.24
***  0.00 
ROE does not Granger-cause NPL  1.77  0.08 
NPL does not Granger-cause ROE  3.13
***  0.00 
ROA does not Granger-cause P  2.00
**  0.04 
P does not Granger-cause ROA  0.88  0.57 
ROE does not Granger-cause P  1.53  0.14 
P does not Granger-cause ROE  1.08  0.39 
Note: This table shows the results of the Granger causality tests.  NPL is the 
nonperforming loan ratio, P is the housing price in NT$ per ping in real terms, ROA is 
the return on bank assets, and ROE is the return on bank equity.  All series are in real 
terms with respect to the first quarter of 1996.  The lag length of 12 quarters is from the 
co-integration analysis reported in Table 3.  The second column of the table shows the 
F statistics of the null hypothesis that the lag coefficient of the causal variable is equal 
to zero.  The asterisks indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent or better 
(***) and 5 percent (**) levels of significance. 
 
 
Table 5  Granger Causality Tests of the Interaction of Nonperforming 
Loans, Banking Sector Profitability, and Real Estate Valuation 
Using Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
ECM 1  D(NPL)  D(P) 
  -0.002 (-0.52)  -0.036 (-2.75)
* 
ECM 2  D(NPL)  D(SRB) 
 -0.002  (-1.86)
*  -0.77 (-3.15)
*** 
ECM 3  D(NPL)  D(GBRI) 
  -0.002 (-0.52)  -0.036 (-2.75)
*** 
ECM 4  D(P)  D(SRB) 
 -0.002  (-1.86)
*  -0.224 (-2.47)
** 
ECM 5  D(P)  D(GBRI) 
  0.000 (0.00)  -0.013 (-2.61)
*** 
Note: This table shows the Granger causality tests using the vector error 
autocorrelation model (VEC).  NPL is the nonperforming loan ratio, P is the housing 
price in NT$ per ping in real terms, SRB is the stock return to the banking sector, and 
GBRI is the general banking return index.  The first column of the table indicates the 
five error correction models (ECM), which correspond to the five pairs of variables that 
are consistent with the co-integration vectors found in Table 3.  The dependent 
variables, which are the first differences (as indicated by the letter “D”) of the quantities 
in parentheses, are shown next to the model number.  The numbers below the 
dependent variables are the coefficients of the error correction terms, which indicate the 
long-term influence of the causal variable.  The numbers in parentheses are the t-56 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
statistics of the coefficients.  All series are in real terms with respect to the first quarter 
of 1996.  The lag length of 12 quarters is from the co-integration analysis reported in 
Table 3.  The coefficients for the 12 lagged variables of the dependent variables, as 
well as those for the causal variables, are not shown in the table.  One asterisk 
indicates a 10 percent level of significance; two asterisks indicate a 5 percent level of 
significance; and three asterisks indicate a 1 percent level of significance or better. 
 
 
The second specification arises from the determinants of the bank 
profitability (BP) and is expressed as follows: 
 
( ) t t t d t l t t t Loan R R g NPL BP µ β β β β β + + − + + + = 4 , , 3 2 1 0
 (2) 
 
where BP is the bank profitability, NPL is the nonperforming loan ratio, g is 
the GDP growth rate, Rl is the is the primary lending rate, Rd is the deposit 
rate, and Loan is the amount of total loans in nominal terms.  We expected β1 
< 0, β2 > 0, β3 > 0, and β4 > 0. 
 
The third specification explains the housing price level in nominal terms: 
 
t t t t t Vac g NPL P ξ γ γ γ γ + + + + = 3 2 1 0  (3) 
 
where P is the housing price in nominal terms, NPL is the nonperforming 
loan ratio, g is the GDP growth rate, and Vac is the rate of change of vacant 
housing.  We predicted γ1 < 0, γ2 > 0,  and γ3 < 0. 
 
Equation (1) can be incorporated into Equations (2) and (3); therefore, we 
can rewrite the structural form model as a reduced form model consisting 
only of the banking profitability and the housing price determinants.  This 
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where BP is the bank profitability, g is the GDP growth rate, P is the housing 
price in nominal terms, Rr is the real estate lending rate, Rl is the is the 
primary lending rate, Corp is the amount of corporate real estate loans, Ind is 
the amount of individual real estate loans, Rd is the is the deposit rate, and Banking System, Real Estate Markets, and Nonperforming Loans 57 
 
Vac is the rate of change of vacant housing.  We expected the following 
relationships to hold: A2 > 0, A3 > 0, A4 > 0, A5 > 0, A6 > 0, A7 > 0, A8 < 0, 
A9 > 0, B2 > 0, B3 > 0, B4 > 0, B5 > 0, B6 > 0, and B7 > 0.  
In other words, the banking profitability depends on current and previous 
GDP growth rates, the housing price, the relative cost of real estate 
borrowing, the ratio of corporate to individual real estate loans, the spread 
between the lending rate and the deposit rate, the rate of change in vacant 
housing, and the total amount of loans.  Similarly, the housing price depends 
on the current and previous GDP growth rates, the previous level of housing 
price, the relative cost of real estate borrowing, the ratio of corporate to 
individual real estate loans, and the rate of change in vacant housing. 
 
 
Table 6  Regression Results - Structural Form 







1 − t g   -0.122*** 
(-6.28) 
  




1 − − t t P P   0.361 
(1.03) 
  
1 , 1 , / − − t l t r R R   -13.761*** 
(-16.11) 
  
t d t l R R , , −    0.010 
(0.42) 
 
1 1/ − − t t Ind Corp   -1.929** 
(-2.06) 
  
t Loan    0.002 
(1.15) 
 




t Vac      -1.743 
(-1.235) 
Sample Size  81  81  81 
2 R   0.927 0.249  0.540 
Note: This table shows the results of Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.  The first 
model has the nonperforming loan ratio (NPL) as the dependent variable, the second 
model has the bank profitability (BP) as the dependent variable, and the third model 
has the housing price (P) as the dependent variable.  All variable definitions remain the 
same as in Table 2.  The figures in parentheses represent the t-values.  One asterisk (*) 
represents significance at the 10 percent level, two asterisks (**) represent significance 
at the 5 percent level, and three asterisks (***) represent significance at the 1 percent 
level or better. 58 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
 
In order to avoid the biases caused by institutional changes, we excluded the 
recent observations.  The sampling period thus spans from January 1996 to 
September 2002, which resulted in 81 observations.  Table 6 shows the 
results of Equations (1), (2), and (3).  With the exception of one result, the 
significant outcomes are consistent with our hypotheses.  We found that the 
ratio of corporate to individual real estate loans is negatively significant at 
the 5 percent level in determining the nonperforming loan ratio.  We 
observed that the relative cost of real estate borrowing is negatively 
significant at the 1 percent level in determining the nonperforming loan ratio.  
We also observed that the GDP growth rate is negatively significant in 
determining the nonperforming loan ratio. 
 
Table 7  Regression Results - Reduced Form 
Model BP  P 
Constant -0.160 
(-1.26) 
      0.670 
      (1.32) 








1 − t P   0.004 
(0.55) 
       0.890*** 
(22.82) 




t d t l R R , , −   -0.017 
(-0.88) 
 




t Loan        0.006** 
(2.05) 
 




    
Sample Size  81  81 
2 R   0.37 0.95 
This table shows the results of Equations (4) and (5), respectively.  The first model has 
the bank profitability (BP) as the dependent variable and the second model has the 
housing price (P) as the dependent variable.  All variable definitions remain the same 
as in Table 2.  The figures in parentheses represent the t-values.  One asterisk (*) 
represents significance at the 10 percent level, two asterisks (**) represent significance 
at the 5 percent level, and three asterisks (***) represent significance at the 1 percent 
level or better. 
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The only significance for the banking profitability came from the 
nonperforming ratio percentage, which has a negative and significant effect 
at the 1 percent level.  The puzzling outcome is the negative and significant 
relationship between the housing price and GDP growth rate.  We predicted 
the coefficient to be positive, since we would expect the real estate market to 
perform better when the overall economy is doing well.  One possible reason 
is that Taiwan’s housing prices display a certain degree of rigidity while 
economic growth fluctuates.  Therefore, the concurrent changes do not 
necessarily represent a reaction to the same variables.  The nonperforming 
loan ratio also has a negative and significant (1 percent level) impact on the 
housing price.  The reduced form equations are regressed in Table 7.  We 
observed that the banking profitability is positively affected at the 1 percent 
level by the relative cost of real estate borrowing, which is consistent with 
our hypothesis.  We also found that the total amount of loans is a positive 
and significant determinant of bank profitability at the 5 percent level.  The 
rate of change in vacant housing is expected to have a negative impact on 
profitability, but instead the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level.  Again, this is presumably due to the real estate market 
behaving fairly rigidly when compared to the banking sector or the general 
economy.  Finally, we observed that the past level of housing prices is a very 
significant and positive determinant of the current level of housing prices. 
The analysis was also conducted with variables in real terms and the results, 
which were not reported in the tables, are qualitatively similar.  Where there 
is indication of autocorrelation as measured by Durbin-Watson tests, 
Cochrane-Orcutt generalized differencing procedures were used.  The results 





The risky lending behavior of banks and the recessive real estate sector can 
cause increasing levels of nonperforming loans.  In turn, a high percentage 
of nonperforming loans can push banks to adopt more restrictive real estate 
lending policies, causing the real estate market to slump.  This paper 
analyzed the interactions of the nonperforming loan ratio, the returns to the 
banking sector, and the real estate market.  Using Granger causality tests, we 
found that the nonperforming loan ratio can indeed have an effect on bank 
profitability.  The converse is also true: bank profitability has an impact on 
the nonperforming loan ratio.  We also found that the bank profitability and 
the housing price have causal relationships.  To better analyze the 
determinants of each of these three factors, we modeled a set of 
simultaneous equations.  We predicted that the nonperforming loan ratio can 
be explained by the GDP growth rate, the change in housing price, the 60 Wu, Chang and Selvili 
   
relative cost of real estate borrowing, and the ratio of corporate to individual 
real estate loans.  We found that all but the change in housing price are 
important determinants of the nonperforming loan ratio.  We also modeled 
the banking profitability by including the GDP growth rate, the spread 
between the lending rate and the deposit rate, the total amount of loans, and 
the nonperforming loan ratio.  The results suggested that the nonperforming 
loan ratio affects banking profitability negatively, as expected.  Furthermore, 
we predicted the explanatory variables for the housing price.  We expected 
the GDP growth rate, the nonperforming loan ratio, and the rate of change in 
vacant housing to be important in explaining the housing price.  We found 
that the growth rate was significant, but with the wrong sign, which could be 
due to the inflexibility of the real estate market in the short run.  In contrast, 
we observed that the nonperforming loan ratio affects the housing price 
negatively.  Finally, we modeled two reduced form equations and found that 
the relative cost of real estate borrowing and the total amount of loans affect 
the banking profitability.  Another possible result, perhaps due to the 
inflexibility of the real estate market, is the positive relationship between the 
rate of change in vacant housing and the banking profitability.  We observed 
that the past level of the housing price is the single most important 
determinant of the current level of the housing price.  
 
The findings of this study provide policy insights.  Reducing the 
nonperforming loan ratio has a positive influence on both the real estate 
sector as well as the banking system.  Adjusting the real estate lending 
policies is a possible way of reducing the nonperforming loan ratio.   
However, banks must perform this adjustment with care.  If they make their 
policies too conservative, real estate lending could drastically contract, 
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